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Supreme Court Extends the Automobile
Exception: California v. Carney
I.

INTRODUCTION

Does a person driving a motor home on a public highway have
a legitimate expectation that the fourth amendment' will protect him
from a warrantless search of his vehicle? That was the question
presented to the Supreme Court in California v. Carney,2 where the
Court held that a warrantless search of a fully mobile motor home
is permissible based on the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement. 3 Utilizing a balancing test to determine whether there
was a legitimate expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle resembling
a home, the Court adopted the approach that a motor vehicle traveling on a public thoroughfare, subject to pervasive regulation, cannot
be excluded from the "automobile exception."" Because the use of
a motor home also met the ready mobility requirement for invocation of the exception, the Court found that it was clearly applicable. 5
This note is intended to provide the reader with a clearer
understanding of the Court's decision, explaining both its rationale
and the precedent it has followed. Secondly, it explores the history
of the "automobile exception" as it applies to all types of vehicles.
Third, it presents the possible impact this decision will have on future
law enforcement techniques.

II.
A.

HISTORY

GENERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

The fourth amendment was intended to safeguard "the privacy

and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmen1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

2. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
3. Id.
4. The Court adopted the approach that there were two justifications necessary
for the applicability of the exception. Either the ready mobility of the vehicle, or

the diminished expectation of privacy associated with vehicles traveling the highway,
would be sufficient to invoke the use of the exception. Id. at 2069-71.
5. Id.
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tal officials." 6 It has been interpreted to require that before an invasion of privacy would be permitted, the inference of probable cause
necessary to secure a search warrant must be "drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 7 In substantiating this interpretation, the Supreme Court has held that "[searches] of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant to
a properly issued search warrant" in order to meet the requisite
guidelines provided for protecting the individual.' This does not mean
"that every search be made pursuant to a warrant. It prohibits only
'unreasonable searches and seizures.' [The test becomes] the
reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances." 9 Whether
the search was reasonable "cannot be fixed by per se rules," but
rather the validity of each search "must be decided on its own facts."'"
Warrantless searches, conducted without prior judicial scrutiny,
"are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' These
exceptions" were "established where it was concluded that the public
interest required some flexibility in the application of the general rule

6. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
8. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979).
9. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509 (1971).
10. Id. at 509-10. For other available approaches, see infra note 11.
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); see,
e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (where the Court looked at
all the circumstances); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (where the
Court combined the "under the circumstances approach" with the "unreasonable
per se approach" to come up with a general statement of unreasonableness); Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (where the Court used the "reasonableness
under all the facts and circumstances" approach); see generally, Comment, The
Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment Principles, 17 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 933, 933 n.4 (1980).
12. There have been numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement. Included
are: United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (protective sweep);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (emergency circumstances); United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); United States v.
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)
(abandonment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (incident to arrest); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (stop and frisk); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (prevention of the
destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (motor vehicle search).
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that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search."' 3 Since the fourth
amendment has been held to apply to the states as well as to the
federal government," the Court has had to adopt a variety of methods
to give state and local law enforcement officials proper procedural
guidelines for handling this type of situation. This note will attempt
to clarify one of the more misunderstood and confusing exceptions
that has been adopted by the Court."
B.' THE "AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION"

1. Early History
The automobile exception first surfaced in American jurisprudence
in Carroll v. United States.'6 In Carroll, federal prohibition agents
spotted a suspected bootlegger traveling along a route known to be
used for the illegal transport of alcohol. After stopping the vehicle
and ordering the suspects out of the car, 7 the agents conducted a
warrantless search of the vehicle and uncovered contraband liquor.
This evidence led to the conviction of the defendants.' 8 In determining whether the officers had acted in a procedurally proper manner,
the Supreme Court held that there is a fundamental difference between a house and an automobile when considering the requirement
of procuring a search warrant.' Therefore, it held the search to be
13. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759.
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (where the Court held that the fourth
amendment, with all its restrictions, applies to the states as well as to the federal
government).
15. Only recently has the Court begun to alleviate the confusion surrounding
the "automobile exception." Before this, "efforts ha[d] failed to clearly define the
scope of the authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles." 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE 508-09 (1978). The Court's decisions have constituted a "labyrinth
of judicial uncertainty." Id. at 509 n.3.
16. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
17. Id. at 136.
18. Id. at 134.
19. Ever since the Carroll decision, the Court has consistently held that for
fourth amendment purposes, a motor vehicle is different than a home:
[Tihe guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of
the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of
a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. See also Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52 (1970) (where the Court
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proper and the convictions were affirmed.2 0

The historical development of the doctrine arose during Prohibi-

tion and the early years following its repeal. It was within the context of these alcohol cases that the Court developed the "automobile

exception" and adapted it to a search-preceding-arrest analysis. 2' The

Court in Carroll reasoned for the first time that "the right to search
and the validity of the seizure are not dependant on the right to arrest." 2 This effectively allowed an officer to search a vehicle based
on probable cause alone that the vehicle contained contraband. No
longer did an arrest have to be made for the officers to conduct a
search of the vehicle. It was this justification, along with the fact
that exigent circumstances surrounded the use of the automobile,2 3
which paved the way for modern analysis concerning the warrantless
intrusion of motor vehicles.
2.

Probable Cause
In 1970, with the decision in Chambers v. Maroney, 4 the Court

held there to be "a constitutional difference between houses and cars" when dealing
with the fourth amendment).
20. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. The Court also held that those individuals lawfully
within the United States using the highways were entitled to free passage, unless
an authorized individual had probable cause to believe that the vehicle in which those
individuals were traveling was transporting contraband. Id. at 154.
21. These early prohibition cases paved the way for the analysis that a search
preceding arrest was procedurally proper for law enforcement personnel. See, e.g.,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (federal agents searched a vehicle
after a suspect admitted carrying twelve cases of liquor across the state line); Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (police searched an automobile, based on confidential information, uncovering contraband; the search, conducted after the car
had come to rest in a garage, just as the driver was leaving, was upheld as incidental
to arrest); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (police, acting on a tip deemed
to constitute probable cause, searched an automobile without a warrant; the Court
upheld the search despite the fact that the car had been staked out, and the driver
had entered the automobile, although the car was not actually in motion). But see

generally Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 127 (1980).

22. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158.
23. The use of a motor vehicle was enough to justify a warrantless search of
a vehicle if the officer had probable cause to believe that contraband was being
transported in the vehicle. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. Later interpretations of Carroll
have furthered this view. "Carroll ... holds a search warrant unnecessary where

there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car
is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally
permissible." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
24. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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began to expand the use of the exception into a viable procedural
device for police in combatting criminal activity.2 5 The Court faced
a different question in Chambers because the search that uncovered
the necessary evidence had taken place after the car had been seized
and taken to the station house.16 The Court adopted the approach
that once probable cause27 exists, the police are free to search the
vehicle, either immediately or later at the police station. The Court
held:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable
cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search,
29
either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The doctrine was further expanded in 1982 with the decision in
United States v. Ross.3" In Ross, the police searched certain containers
inside the trunk of an automobile once they had probable cause to
believe that drug trafficking was taking place. Upon searching the
trunk of the Ross vehicle, they found a closed brown bag. After opening it, they discovered what was later determined to be heroin.' A
further search at the police station uncovered a red pouch containing
$3,200 in cash. All of this took place without a warrant. In holding
that the search was permissible, the Court followed the reasoning in
Chambers, which held that "probable cause [is] a minimum require25. In the 45 years after Carroll, the automobile exception was rarely used.

With the Chambers decision, the exception was expanded to facilitate its use as a

law enforcement tool. See supra note 21.

26. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
27. Probable cause has been defined as "a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction . . . " United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805 (1982) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149). It is also the
requirement that the "determination must be based on objective facts that could
justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective
good faith of the police officers." Id. at 808.
28. "[Ajutomobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant
in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house
or office, provided there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles
that the officers are entitled to seize." Chambers, 399 U.S.-at 48. "One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not require a search warrant is when the
police stop an automobile on the street or highway because they have probable cause
to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760.
29. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
30. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
31. Ross, 456 U.S. at 801.
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ment for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution." 3 2 According to this reasoning, a warrant is not an essential prerequisite
in automobile cases. 33 Subsequent cases following these decisions have
rested on the ground that Carroll now means probable cause alone
justifies the search. 3" This has placed automobiles and other moving
vehicles into an exempt class regarding the warrant requirement once
probable cause is found to exist." It is important to note that the
Court "refused to adopt a rule that would permit a warrantless seizure
but not permit a warrantless search." 3 By so doing, they have
eliminated many of the various alternatives available to the police.37
3.

Justifications

The Supreme Court has primarily relied on two separate rationales
for allowing the warrantless search of motor vehicles. They began
with the rationale that an automobile could be searched because the
''opportunity to search is fleeting,'' 3 and therefore inherent exigent
circumstances surround the use of an automobile which call for immediate action. 39 Under situations where there is no actual exigency,
the Court has relied on either the "diminished expectation of privacy"" 0
that one has while in an automobile, or the increased administrative
burdens involved with trying to procure a search warrant after seizing the motor vehicle" in order to justify the search. To come up
32. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.

33. "[Aln individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may
not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband." Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
34. See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents:
Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 34

(1983).

35. Gardner, supra note 34, at 35. The decisions have allowed warrantless searches based on the inherent exigency surrounding the motor vehicle. See infra notes
38-52 and accompanying text.
36. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.
37. For example, police no longer need to seize the vehicle and then try and
obtain a warrant. For other alternatives that may have been limited, see infra note 119.
38. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
39. For cases dealing with the inherent exigency created merely by the use of
an automobile, see Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers,
399 U.S. at 42 (1970); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132 (1925).
40. For cases dealing with the diminished expectation of privacy rationale, see
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974); see infra note 58.
41. For a discussion of the increased administrative burdens, see Sanders, 442
U.S. at 765 n.14. See infra notes 48, 121.
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with a workable solution to the warrant exception problem, the Court
has adopted a balancing approach designed to meet the interests of
the individual while allowing some measure of police expediency.
a.

Inherent Mobility

Since the origin of the doctrine in Carroll, the Court has declared
that the mobility of an automobile creates exigent circumstances making
it necessary to allow a warrantless search., 2 This is true because "the
automobile's owner is alerted to public intentions and, as a consequence, the motivation to remove evidence from official grasp is
heightened."" 3 Carroll was premised on the mobility of the vehicle,
along with the defendant's capability to remove the vehicle and any
evidence contained within it from the jurisdiction in which the warrant need be obtained.
This view of Carroll was reaffirmed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, " ' where the Court rejected the idea that a warrantless search
is reasonable merely because a movable vehicle is involved without
proof of actual exigent circumstances. The Court acknowledged the
impracticality of procuring a search warrant when dealing with an
automobile, but reaffirmed the requirement that a search warrant is
necessary in motor vehicle cases unless it is impractical to procure one.46
In Coolidge the Court declined to allow the inherent mobility
of an automobile to become the sole criterion for the application of
the exception. It should be noted, however, that the continued vitality of that decision is very much in doubt due to the contemporary
alternative rationales supporting the exception.
With both the
diminished expectation of privacy and the increased administrative
burdens placed upon the police, the Court has found alternate justifica42. The Carroll decision rested primarily on the premise that the automobile
could be removed from the jurisdiction; thus, there were inherent exigent circumstances
surrounding the search. But if the automobile was not actually in transit, the applicability of the exception was questionable. "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used." Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. Cf.
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 42 (where the Court disregarded this statement as dicta in
basing its decision on the inherent mobility of motor vehicles).
43. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
44. See supra note 42.

45. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

46. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 459-64.
47. Coolidge was predicated on the belief that actual mobility of the vehicle
was the sole justification for the application of the exception. With the alternative
justification of diminished expectation of privacy becoming viable, the Coolidge decision has lost much of its credibility.
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tions for allowing a warrantless search." The Coolidge decision is
also the only case in the history of the exception in which the Supreme
Court, based on a lack of exigency, has ruled a search invalid. It
refused to allow the search to be conducted on the mere presumption
of exigency.

In the cases that followed, the Court moved to extend the ex-

igency rationale for a warrantless seizure to include the presumption
of exigency, rather than merely those situations where the vehicle was
actually departing the jurisdiction."9 With these cases in mind, the
Court in Carney had to determine whether the exception was to be
interpreted as being solely based on inherent mobility, or if the actual movement of the vehicle was necessary.

The Court has now declared that the police may conduct a

warrantless search of a vehicle even if no actual emergency makes

it impractical to immobilize the car and apply for a search warrant5 0

Moreover, the Court declared that the inherent exigency of the
automobile does not vanish once the car has been immobilized." This
view has given the police the power to search a vehicle based solely

48. Significantly, the Court chose not to require the police to seize and hold
a vehicle until a warrant could be obtained. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13; Sanders,
442 U.S. at 765-66 n.14.
49. The Court has allowed probable cause alone, without the existence of actual exigent circumstances, to justify a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile.
These decisions have sustained "warrantless searches in cases in which the possibilities
of the vehicles being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973). See also Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 583 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 42 (1970). Contra, Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (the
Court found no evidence of exigent circumstances to justify the search, asserting
there must be some real possibility that the automobile may be moved).
50. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). The Court has also held that when
a vehicle is lawfully in police custody, it may be searched on the basis of probable
cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent
circumstances to justify such a warrantless search. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.
259, 261-62 (1982) (per curiam); see also United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136,
140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (mobility, without more, was sufficient to justify a warrantless search based upon probable cause simply because the exigency arose when
the police were confronted with a motor vehicle in a public place and in apparent
working condition).
51. [Tihe justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish
once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon the reviewing
court's assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would
have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with,
during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.
Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261 (citations omitted).
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on probable cause, notwithstanding the fact that there may not be
any actual emergency or any difficulty involved in obtaining a search
warrant. 2 These decisions have effectively overruled the Coolidge decision by pronouncing inherent exigency a sufficient justification for
application of the exception.
b.

Diminished Expectation of Privacy

It has always been a balancing question as to whether the gravity of an intrusion into a person's automobile is outweighed by the
need for law enforcement officials to conduct a search before allowing the vehicle to leave the jurisdiction. Although the early decisions
of the Court held the mobility of an automobile to be the sole requirement for invocation of the exception, the Court recently expanded
its analysis to include the diminished expectation of privacy as an
independent rationale."
The Court has repeatedly examined the expectation of privacy
associated with the use of a motor vehicle and has determined that
the privacy interest should be protected against warrantless invasions
only if the individual's expectation of privacy is justified.54 In Cardwell v. Lewis,55 the Court took the view that there is a "lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it . . .has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its con5
tents are in plain view." 1

6

52. The Court has repeatedly held that, based upon probable cause, the inherent mobility of motor vehicles may be sufficient by itself to justify a warrantless
search. Ross, 456 U.S. at 798 (1982), interpreted Carroll as requiring only probable
cause as the prerequisite to a,valid search. The Court failed to mention that actual
mobility was a requirement, therefore implying that-the mobility inherent in the use
and design of motor vehicles was sufficient. See also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67
(1975) (the Court suggested that actual exigency was not a requirement); Thomas,
458 U.S. at 259 (1982). In Carney, no actual exigency existed because the courthouse
was only minutes away.
53. "Due to their configuration, use and regulation, only a limited expectation
of privacy attaches to motor vehicles, and their mobility creates an exigency that
makes obtaining a warrant impracticable. Because the exigency outweighs the limited
privacy in vehicles, police may search them as long as probable cause is present."
Whitfield, 629 F.2d at 141. See also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761.
54. In determining whether an individual has a legitimate privacy interest in
the article involved, the Court looks to see whether the individual has met the two
part test set forth by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), (Harlan, J.,
concurring), which requires that the individual have an actual subjective expectation
of privacy that is objectively reasonable by societal standards.
55. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
56. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
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After re-examining its rational for the Chambers decision, the
Court came to the conclusion that, at least in part, people have only
minimal expectations of privacy in their automobiles, and that reduced
expectation renders searches of automobiles less intrusive." Other decisions have further strengthened this view. 8 These cases have made
the diminished expectation of privacy rationale an independent basis
for the use of the exception.

There are recurring factors the Court has found to promote the

diminished expectation of privacy rationale. Those included are a motor
vehicles transportation function, its vehicle registration, and its being
subjected to traffic regulations." The courts have also advanced the
argument that there would be increased administrative burdens on
law enforcement agencies if the exception was unduly limited.6" Thus,
it was up to the Supreme Court to determine whether the use and
characteristics of a motor home fit into the exceptions offered above,
or if an individual's expectation of privacy outweighed the need for
law enforcement expediency.
III.
A.

CALIFORNIA

V.

CARNEY

FACTS OF THE CASE

During the investigation of drug related activity in downtown San
Diego on May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Agent Robert Williams noticed the defendant, Charles Carney, approach a young Mexican boy." After a few moments of conversa57. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
58. Numerous decisions by the Court have substantiated the diminished expectation of privacy rationale associated with a motor vehicle as an independent justification for the use of the "autorfiobile exception." See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) where the Court stated that:
[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine
vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other
violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if
headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
Id. at 368. See also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at I (a warrantless search was permissible
because such intrusions offend only minimal privacy expectations).
59. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13 (factors noted by the Court included that
motor vehicles are used for transportation; they travel in public, exposing both their
occupants and their contents to the view of others; they are licensed and regulated
in a multitude of manners by various governmental agencies; and that they are often
impounded by the police in the interest of either public safety or the individual's
protection).
60. See infra note 121.
61. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
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tion, the pair walked a short distance to a nearby parking lot, where
the defendant had parked a Dodge motor home. They entered the
motor home and closed the curtains. 2
Agent Williams noticed the license number of the vehicle and
remembered that he had received uncorroborated information that this
vehicle had on numerous occasions been involved in drug activity.63
Agent Williams knew that this motor home belonged to Lee Bowman,
a suspected drug dealer who had been exchanging marijuana for sex
with young boys. 61 This activity had been taking place inside the motor
home. Concluding that Carney had taken the place of Bowman,
Williams requested additional officers to aid in the surveillance. After
the officers observed the motor home for about an hour and a quarter,
65
the young boy emerged from inside.
The agents followed the boy, then stopped and questioned him
about the activities that had taken place inside the motor home. In
response to their questions, the boy admitted that he had been given
marijuana inside the motor home in exchange for allowing the older
man to perform oral copulation on him.66
The agents then accompanied the boy back to the motor home
and told him to knock on the door. After he did so, Carney stepped
outside. The agents identified themselves, and one of them stepped
inside to search for other occupants in the vehicle and for contraband. Once inside, the agent observed two bags of marijuana, a scale
used for measuring drugs, and some plastic bags, all in plain view
on a table. 67 Based on their observations, the agents placed Carney
under arrest and drove the motor home to the police station. During
an inventory search at the station, they also found marijuana inside
the cupboard above the table and inside the refrigerator. Carney was
then charged with the possession of marijuana for sale.68
62. Id.
63. The information was received from an organization called "We Tip" (We
Turn In Pushers) through various letters and telephone conversations with Agent
Williams. Respondent's Brief at 5.
64. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Carney was charged with.violating CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359
(West 1975) which provided:
(a) Every person who possesses for sale any marijuana, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for a period of not less than two years or more than 10 years and shall
not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or any
other basis until he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than two
years in the state prison.
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Carney's motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search
of the motor home was denied at the preliminary hearing.69 The
magistrate admitted the evidence based on the rationale that the officer had the right to enter the motor home to look for any other
persons who could be hidden inside. The subsequent search at the
police station was held to be a proper inventory search.7"
The motion to suppress was denied at the California Superior
Court level because the search was deemed to fall within the
"automobile exception." 7 ' Thus, once probable cause to search existed, the officers had the right to enter and search the motor home.
Once they found marijuana inside, the motor home was properly seized
as the instrumentality of a crime.72
On March 18, 1981, the California Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, and
upheld the conviction.73 The court affirmed based on the "automobile
exception." But on September 8, 1983, the California Supreme Court
reversed the conviction and remanded. ' The court held that the prime
justification for the "automobile exception" was not a vehicle's ready
mobility. Rather, the justification was held to be the expectation of
privacy factor that surrounded its use. Since a motor home has living
quarters, the court decided it was more like a home and not subject
to the exception.7 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
on March 19, 1984.6
B.

ANALYSIS

1. The California Supreme Court Decision
Before directly entering into an analysis of the Supreme Court's
decision, it is necessary to discuss the reasoning of the state high court.
The California Supreme Court initially restated the premise that the
69. The magistrate declared the search of the motor home was a proper protective search to look for other people who might pose a danger to the agents. Carney,
105 S. Ct. at 2067-68.
70. Id. at 2068.
71. Id.

72. Id. Carney withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of nolo con-

tendere. On January 8, 1980, Carney was placed on three years probation. Id. at 2068.
73.
74.
75.
quarters

117 Cal. App. 3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
34 Cal.3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983).
The court concluded that because the motor home contained private living
that included a refrigerator and bed, it was more like a home than an

automobile for fourth amendment purposes. See infra notes 79-91.
76. 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984).
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fourth amendment provides protection to private individuals by requiring the approval of a judicial officer before law enforcement agencies may undertake most searches. This requirement was stated to
be an "important working part of our machinery of government." 7' 7
The fact that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable"8 led the
court to assign the state the burden of proving the search of the motor
home fell within one of the delineated exceptions.
The California court interpreted prior case law as making the
automobile exception applicable only where it could be demonstrated
that exigent circumstances rendered the obtaining of a warrant an
impracticable alternative, and that probable cause existed for the
search.7 9 The difficulty arose when the court had to choose between
two distinct lines of cases regarding the applicability of the exception
based on inherent mobility alone.8" After deciding that the exception
should only be applied if actual mobility exists, the court stated,
"[m]obility [is] no longer the prime justification for the automobile
exception." 8 ' Rather, the diminished expectation of privacy associated
with an automobile was considered its principal justification.
After examining various factors associated with the automobile
(transportation function, public nature of travel, and pervasive and
continuing governmental regulations and controls), the court concluded
that a motor home did not possess the criteria necessary to invoke
the exception.8 It was unwilling to concede that these factors could
also apply to a motor home.
First, the court held that the primary function of a motor home
is not transportation. 3 Instead, the court reasoned that "motor homes
are generally designed and used as residences," with their main function as providing the occupant with either temporary or permanent
living quarters.8 ' This conclusion was based on the fact that the con77. People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d at 603, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
78. See supra note II.
79. People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d at 604, 668 P.2d at 810, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 503.

80. Cases disagreed on whether actual mobility was necessary to create the exigency necessary for application of the exception. By examining Cady, Chambers,
and Cooper, the court could reasonably conclude that the exception was based on
the inherent mobility of the motor vehicle alone. In contrast, Sanders and Chadwick, seemed to require actual mobility.
81. People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d at 605, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
82. Id. at 606-10, 668 P.2d at 811-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504-07.
83. Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505.

84. Id. The court based its decision on the fact that a motor home had more
characteristics normally associated with a home than an automobile. Thus, the motor
home was deemed to be primarily a device for providing residency.
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tents of the motor home, which included a bed, table, refrigerator,
and chairs, created an atmosphere more closely related to a home."5
Second, the court observed that merely because a "motor home
is not affixed to real property does not demean its potential status
as a house." 8 The fact that a motor home is potentially mobile does
not justify less protection than a non-motor home. Relying on the
diminished expectation of privacy rationale as the primary justification for the exception, the court accepted this argument.
Finally, the court found that the diminished expectation of privacy
normally associated with an automobile could not be extended to a
motor home merely because of its mobility. 7 Analogizing the expectation of privacy in the use of a motor home to that of a boarding
room or hotel room, the court applied the full modicum of fourth
amendment protection regardless of the temporary nature of a motor
home's use. 8 Further, the court acknowledged that the interior of
a motor home is not generally exposed to the public, nor are its occupants, furnishings, or effects.8 9 After rejecting the protective sweep
argument set forth by the state, 0 the court held that a motor home
is deserving of more protection than a general automobile traveling
the highway. Therefore, a motor home did not fall within the ambit
of the automobile exception."
The dissenting opinion took a different view, one which the United
States Supreme Court eventually embraced. After stating the belief
that the California Supreme Court had set forth a confusing and
untenable definition of a "motor home", the dissent stated the better
view as being "if the facts reasonably indicate to the investigating
officer that the vehicle is currently being used primarily as a residence
85. Id. at 606-07, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
86. Id. The court implied that the fact of mobility alone does not conclusively
presume that a motor home could not be protected under the fourth amendment
as fully as a house.
87. Id. at 607, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The court examined
the various factors normally associated with the use of an automobile and deemed
them inapplicable to motor homes, at least to the degree necessary to invoke the
exception.
88. Id. at 607-08, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
89. Id.
90. The court rejected the state's contention that the search was merely a protective sweep, intended to protect the officers from anyone else hiding inside the
motor home. The court denied that the officers, who had been observing the motor
home for over an hour, and who had seen only two people enter or leave, had the
necessary probable cause to believe that such a search was needed. Id. at 611-13,
668 P.2d at 815-17, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 508-10.
91. Id.
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rather than for transportation purposes, then the automobile exception would be inapplicable." 92 To make these determinations, law enforcement agents would have to look at the circumstances surrounding
the use of the motor home.93
2.

The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion

Given probable cause, the warrantless search of a fully mobile
motor home was determined not to violate fourth amendment requirements. 94 The Supreme Court rejected the decision of the state
court by holding that a motor home, although containing some of
the characteristics of a home, should be subject to the same treatment as an automobile when considering the application of the exception. Based on the reduced expectation of privacy when using an
automobile, as well as its inherent ready mobility, the requisite justifications for the automobile exception mandated its application.9 5
After initially discussing general fourth amendment protections,
the Court looked at the automobile exception in detail to determine
its specific applicability to a motor home. In Carroll, it had been
recognized that the ready mobility of the motor vehicle was the primary
basis for the exception.9 6 It was this inherent exigency that justified
dispensing with the warrant requirement.9 7
However, inherent mobility is not the sole justification for the
exception. The Court also recognized a lesser expectation of privacy
when one travels the public highways using a readily mobile vehicle.
Further, the Court has recognized this decreased expectation of privacy
in areas of an automobile that are not within plain view in cases where
it held that even the enclosed repository areas of an automobile are
subject to this diminished expectation of privacy. It is not the plain
view of the contraband or the area to be searched that is important,
but rather the "pervasive regulation of vehicles traveling on the public
highway" that lends credibility to this decreased privacy interest.99

92. Id. at 615, 668 P.2d at 818, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
93. See infra. notes 150-52 and accompanying text. The Court used this rationale in making its final determination.
94. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067-71.
95. Id.at 2070.
96. Id.at 2069. See supra note 42.
97. Id.
98. Id.See also Ross, 456 U.S. at 798; Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 583; Cady, 413
U.S. at 433; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 42 (all discussing the diminished expectation
of privacy rationale).
99. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069; see also Cady, 413 U.S. at 440-41.
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Therefore, when one travels the public thoroughfares in a motor vehicle
subject to governmental regulations, there is a decreased expectation
of privacy regarding both the vehicle and its contents.
Once the probable cause requirement was met, the Court found
that both the pervasive scheme of regulation that accompanies vehicles
traveling on the highway and the ready mobility of motor vehicles
were sufficient factors to allow a warrantless search of a motor
home. ' Applying this reasoning, even a stationary vehicle satisfies
these two justifications, and therefore the exception can be applied.
First, the vehicle is presumed to be readily mobile at the turn of a
key. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in any vehicle
licensed to use the public highways and subject to a wide range of
police regulations not applicable to a fixed residential structure.' 0 1
The Court declined to limit the exception, even though the motor
home possessed some of the characteristics of a home.' 2 The mere
presence of sleeping quarters and a refrigerator did not prevent its
inclusion within the exception. Since it met the two requirements stated
above, it was held subject to search based upon probable cause alone.
The Court also dismissed the argument that the capability of the vehicle
to function as a home should be paramount in the analysis.' 3 In
an increasingly mobile society such as ours, almost any vehicle can
be used as a home.' 0 This realization, along with the fact that a
motor home can be easily used for illicit drug trafficking, influenced
the Court to not limit the exception to those vehicles that can be
used solely for transportation.' 5 The application of the exception had
never been based on the alternative uses of the motor vehicle, and
the Court refused to draw that distinction here.
The Court indicated that a rule predicated on the ready mobility
of the vehicle, along with its presence in a setting that objectively
indicates its use as that of transportation, will ensure that law enforcement officers are not unreasonably hindered in their efforts to

100. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070 (the Court determined that the factors making
an automobile subject to warrantless searches also applied to a motor home).
101. Id.
102. See supra note 75.
103. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
104. The lower court decision was confusing because it failed to provide a precise
definition for the application of the exception to a vehicle with some of the
characteristics of a home. It was unclear what the police would do when facing a
truck with a bed in the rear, or a van with tinted windows and shades. Here, the
Court minimized this problem by allowing the exception to apply to all motor vehicles.
105. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
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detect and prosecute criminal activity.' °6 In effect, the Court has made
a compromise between the expediency needs of the police and the
privacy protections afforded an individual through the fourth amendment. Because the police clearly had probable cause to believe the
vehicle contained contraband, the search was permissible based on
the automobile exception. Therefore, the California Supreme Court
decision was reversed.' °7
The Court was presented with a unique situation when dealing
with a motor home, which the state court had classified as a "hybrid"
between an automobile and a home. Because lower courts had dealt
with similar situations in alternate manners,' 8 the court could draw
support for either potential outcome. Of paramount importance was
the need to balance all of the interests involved.'"" The Court noted
that the police are constantly faced with this type of confrontation,
stating:
[Clountless vehicles are stopped on highways and public streets every
day and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for public
officers to have probable cause to believe that contraband may be
found in a stopped vehicle. In every such case a conflict is presented
between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy
and the public interest in effective law enforcement.'"
In striking the balance, the Court set the standard based on the in106. Id at 2070-71 (this gives law enforcement personnel some discretion, although
not unlimited, in assessing the function of the motor home).
107. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071.
108. The lower courts have dealt with motor home searches in various ways.
State v. Lepley, 343 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1984) (holding that if probable cause existed,
the search was valid). Accord United States v. Hudson, 601 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Million, 583 P.2d
897 (Ariz. 1978); State v. Francoeur, 387 So.2d 1063 (Fla. App. 1980); People v.
Uselding, 350 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. 1976); State v. Mower, 407 A.2d 729 (Me. 1979);
State v. Downes, 571 P.2d 914 (Or. App. 1977); but see United States v. Wiga,
662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding the there was an increased expectation of privacy in a motor home
as compared to a car).
109. "[A] search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy."
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975). It is apparent that the search of
a motor home is likewise an invasion of personal privacy, but the real question
becomes whether or not this invasion is outweighed by the societal objectives being
furthered by the exception. The Carney decision rested in part on the fact that "the
overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search
before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable." Carney, 105 S. Ct. at
2070. In its decision, the Court ruled in favor of this enforcement effectiveness.
110. Ross, 456 U.S. at 803-04.
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dependent interests involved.
Merely "[t]he fact that the protection
of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less
intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.""1 2
This point is illustrated by the Court's refusal to be influenced by
the time element surrounding the search. The Court acknowledged
that a courthouse was only minutes away, but the fact that the agents
could possibly have secured a warrant before conducting the search
did not render it invalid.'' 3 This result conforms to the belief that
a warrant does not always have to be obtained at the first practicable
4
moment."
It is important to define the exception as being based on the
ready mobility of the vehicle, be it an automobile, truck or a motor
home, as well as the diminished expectation of privacy surrounding
it. The inherent mobility of these moving vehicles creates the exigent
circumstances necessary for the application of the exception. Although
"[t]he question of whether exigent circumstances exist is largely a factual one,""' it is this question that the Court has answered by holding
that ready mobility, actual or not, is sufficient to invoke the exception."I 6
The Court has simply expanded and reinforced the CarrollChambers rule, which allows the police to search a vehicle based on
11l.
The Court was faced with an individual's expectation that his motor home
was possibly his mobile "castle," as well as with the need for law enforcement personnel to be able to efficiently combat criminal activity. Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2070.
112. Cady, 413 U.S. at 447. The test is not one involving a "least restrictive
means" approach, but involves only the reasonableness of the intrustion. See.supra
note 11.
113. The fact that a search warrant could possibly have been procured prior
to the search should not be determinative of the reasonableness of the action. "It
is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the
time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant. Whether there
was any time may well be dependent upon considerations other than the ticking off
of minutes or hours." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
114. "Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case
or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the
reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment." Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 595.
115. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1978).
116. Exigent circumstances have been deemed inherent in the use of a motor
vehicle. They are "not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable
and arises only at the time of arrest." Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 595. It is immaterial
whether the police may have obtained a warrant earlier, for "even if the police
possessed probable cause for the vehicle search well before the time that the warrantless search or seizure occurred, it does not inevitably follow that the lack of
a warrant will invalidate the search." 2 W. LAFAVE SEARCH & SEIZURE 524 (1978).
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probable cause alone. Although this rule does not always meet with
public ideals on the proper procedure to be followed by law enforcement officials,'' 7 it does "reflect . . . a reasoned application of the
more general rule that if an individual gives the police probable cause
to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to
proceed on his way without official interference." ' 8
Beside the view expressly stated by the state court, the Supreme
Court was faced with other alternatives when deciding whether to
uphold this search.' In Chambers, the Court had determined that
[fqollowing the car until a warrant can be obtained seems an impractical alternative since, among other things, the car may be taken
out of the jurisdiction. Tracing the car and searching it hours or
days later would of course permit instruments or fruits of the crime
to be removed from the car before the search.' 0
Other alternatives have fared no better.''
Prior interpretations of the exception had already declared that
there was not a significant increase in the amount of privacy invaded
by immediately searching the vehicle once it was seized, as opposed
to immobilizing it while the warrant was obtained.' 22 There are also
117. Often private citizens view police intrusion into their vehicles as a violation
of their substantive rights, regardless of the acts committed by these individuals.
118. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.
119. The officer engaged in law enforcement activity has three choices when
he comes in contact with an automobile in which there exists probable cause for
a search. He can immediately search the vehicle without a search warrant through
the automobile exception; he can seize the occupants of the vehicle until the search
warrant is procured, thereby preventing them the opportunity to remove any evidence;
or he can impound the car to immobilize it until the warrant may be obtained. Gardner, supra note 34, at 7.
120. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51 n.9. (although in Carney the vehicle was not
actually moving).
121. The temporary seizure of the motor vehicle would create serious burdens
on both the large and the small law enforcement agencies. There would be increased
administrative difficulties due to the increased paperwork and personnel. There would
also be a greater expense on the law enforcement agencies through an increasing
number of impounded vehicles, as well as a greater danger in possibly controlling
the seized vehicle and its occupants. See generally, Comment, supra note 11, at 959.
See also supra note 41.
122. Given the significant encroachment on privacy interests entailed by a
seizure of personal property, the additional intrusion of a search may well
be regarded as incidental. Moreover, the additional protection provided by
a search warrant will be minimal. Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that the warrant will be
routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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other situations where differing alternatives would be unfeasible.' 23
The Court rejected the argument that there were adequate and

independent state grounds supporting the state court decision. 2 " It
is fundamental that if the state court decision was explicitly based
on the California Constitution, then the United States Supreme Court
should not have acted so as to render an advisory opinion. However,
the Court determined that not to be, the case in Carney.'25
3.

The Dissent

The dissenting opinion addressed three separate and distinct issues
concerning the failure of the majority to properly analyze the warrantless search of a motor home.' 26 The dissent presented a valid
hypothesis as to why the controversy surrounding the automobile exception had not been conclusively settled before. The close six-to-three

decision is indicative of the internal conflict still surrounding the issue.
Initially, the dissent expressed its reservations at the Court's lack

of trust in state courts and the resulting "improvident exercise of discretionary jurisdiction."' 27 The dissenters said that the lower state courts
should have been allowed to further evaluate the alternatives available
before reaching a conclusion.' 2 8 This was not a case where an in123. As an example, an officer may have sufficient control to search the vehicle, but not to hold it until a search warrant can be obtained. The exigency still
exists because the police officer has no way of preventing the automobile from leaving the jurisdiction.
124. Carney argued that the state court decision "is explicitly based on Article
1, section 13 of the California Constitution, a provision prominently and independently
cited by the California Supreme Court before mention of the Fourth Amendment."
Respondent's Brief at 3, Carney (citations omitted).
125. The Court foreclosed this argument based on its previous opinion in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983), in which it held:
[Wihen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal
law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face
of the opinion, [the Court] will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so.
In this decision, the Court held that the state court opinion rested on federal law.
Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068 n.1.
126. The dissent argued that the majority erred in three respects: "It has entered
new territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to the exception rather than to
the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior
cases." Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071.
127. Id. at 2072 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 2071-73.
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dividual had been denied a right guaranteed to him under the Constitution. Rather, the state court "upheld a citizen's assertion of a
right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state
law."" ' 9 This made it unnecessary for the majority to proclaim a rule
which would be binding upon all of the state and federal courts. The
dissent argued that by upholding the lower state court decision, the
Court would merely have been supporting a law applicable only to
that particular state.' 30 In essence, that approach would have given
the Court the opportunity to view alternate approaches to the problem in actual practice.
If the Court did act prematurely, it has effectively limited the
"natural growth and refinement of alternative principles."' 3 ' By not
allowing this natural process to run to completion, the dissenters
argued, the Court has deviated from rational decisionmaking which
"counsels against divining the uses and abuses of these vehicles in
the vacuum of the first case raising the question."' 3 2 However, it is
debatable whether the Court has actually hindered this process, for
it can always be asserted that more informed and well-reasoned decisions will be reached when various alternatives have been explored
more fully by the lower courts and the states that have adopted them.
In Carney, it is at least arguable that the Court did have adequate
lower court decisions and their respective applications on which to
base its conclusion.'

33

Secondly, the dissenters argued that priority had been accorded
the exception rather than the rule. The Court's previous interpretation of fourth amendment principles had set forth a "bright line"
rule declaring that searches without a warrant were per se
unreasonable. 34 In Ross, the Court had favored a narrow construction of the automobile exception.' 3 5 In Carney, the dissent stated that
this long-standing interpretation had not been followed. Since the sanctity of the warrant clause, with its express requirements, was not to
129. Id. at 2073 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
130. Id. Merely affirming without opinion would have allowed the decision to
stand in California, while still allowing the other states an opportunity to decide
for themselves.
131.
132.
133.
including

Id.
Id.
Based on the number of lower court decisions dealing with the exception,
those specifically involving motor homes, the Court had a sufficient basis

for deciding the issue. See supra note 108.

134. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

135. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824-25.
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be weighed against police efficiency when determining the application of the exception, 3 6 the prioritizing of the exception rather than
the rule weakened the protections of the fourth amendment.
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority had failed to properly characterize the motor home in regard to its actual expectation
of pr.ivacy.' 37 By looking at the surrounding circumstances associated
with the use of a motor home, the dissent concluded that the owner
of a motor home clearly exhibits an expectation of privacy.' 35 According to the dissent, the automobile exception only allows a search if
the vehicle is traveling on a public highway or if there are exigent
circumstances present.' 3 9 If the motor home is not on a public highway,
then a greater expectation of privacy results when the vehicle's size,
shape, and mode of construction indicate its use as a place of residence,
or that it contains living quarters. 40 Vehemently disagreeing with the
majority approach, which effectively creates "a conclusive presumption of exigency,"' 4 ' the dissent contended that "searches of places
that regularly accommodate a wide range of private activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve
a public transportation function."' 42 Because it concluded that a motor
home possessed many of the characteristics of a home, the dissent
concluded that a motor home should not be subject to the automobile
exception. However, this view denies any effect to the ready mobility
rationale expressed by the majority. The dissent has based all of its
conclusions on the limited diminished expectation of privacy associated
with the use of a motor home, while denying the inherent mobility
it possesses.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court has laid to rest the argument that the exception is
not applicable to all types of motor vehicles. Inappropriately labeled
the "automobile exception" rather than the "motor vehicle excep136. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2075 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971)).
137. Id. (The dissent stated that a motor home containing a bed, refrigerator,
curtains, and other similar home-related items clearly advances a legitimate expectation of privacy more pronounced than that of an automobile).
138. Id. at 2075-78.
139. Id. at 2075. (This was the view set forth in Carroll. The search would
be allowed only if the vehicle was actually moving or if there existed an actual exigency). See supra note 41.
140. Id. at 2077.
141. Id. at 2076.
142. Id. at 2078.
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tion," this misnomer has served to create confusion in the minds of
law enforcement officials as to whether a warrantless search would
be permissible. Logically, this exception has never been limited only
to automobiles. The police are now free from burdensome confusion
and can operate with the benefit of the "bright line" rule the Court
43
has adopted. 1
Certain implications of this decision are sure to follow. Recently,
in United States v. Bagley,'" a federal court of appeals utilized the
Carney decision in ruling that "under the automobile exception, probable cause alone suffices to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle
parked in a public place, as long as the scope of the search is
reasonable.' 5 This is not so drastic a change as one might think considering that after Ross, it was presumed that if a police officer has
probable cause, he would be allowed to search an automobile or motor
vehicle based on this exception. '" These more recent decisions merely
extend this same analysis to a parked vehicle that is inherently mobile.
This decision has also helped to clarify the role of a warrant.
The Court stated:
[Ilf warrants are required for all searches and seizures but those under
truly exigent circumstances, then the warrant process becomes a
mechanical routine with relatively little magisterial scrutiny, but that
if on the other hand warrants are required for a comparatively small
group of police activities which are highly intrusive in nature, then
the tendency will be to give these warrant requests close examina47
tion.
If the Court had balanced the scale in favor of the individual's right
to privacy, the exception would have been weakened and drug traffickers would have had a greater opportunity to transport contraband
in the privacy of their motor homes. Rather, the Court has made
it clear that when an individual enters the highway in a readily mobile
motor vehicle subject to pervasive governmental regulations, he has

143. The Court has adopted an approach that allows law enforcement agents
to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle when they possess the requisite
probable cause. This is a "bright line" approach that avoids confusion and allows
the police to carry on more simply in their day-to-day activities. See generally, Ross,
456 U.S. at 803-04. (where the Court responded to the necessity for a "bright line"
rule in vehicle search cases by expressly giving police a mobility test on which to
gauge their conduct).
144. 765 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1985).
145. Id. at 844 (quoting from Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066).
146. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
147. 2 W.

LAFAVE,

SEARCH & SEIZURE

508, 518 (1978).
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lost the right of free passage once there exists probable cause to suspect
he is carrying contraband. Moreover, this right of free passage is lost
regardless of the type of motor vehicle being used. This view was
advanced in United States v. White,'" in which a federal court of
appeals utilized Carney to express a limitation on the legitimate expectation of privacy one has when traveling in an automobile because
of the "pervasive regulation" of vehicles. Thus, Carney has fully expressed the independence of the various rationales supporting the
exceptions.
The Court has also presented law enforcement agencies with a
"bright line" rule with which to gauge their conduct. If there exists
probable cause, the officer is free to conduct a warrantless search
of the motor vehicle as long as the vehicle is objectively being used
for transportation, rather than as a residence.' 49 "[T]here is a
demonstrable need for clear guidelines by which police can gauge and
regulate their conduct, rather than a complex set of rules dependant
upon the particular facts.""'5 The Court has tried to fill that need.
The Court also placed logical limits on the rule, however. It noted
that if a motor home is situated in such a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence, then the "automobile
exception" may not be applicable.' 5 ' This gives the exception a strong
foundation, and acts as protection against misuse. The police are given
the right to search a vehicle based on probable cause, but they cannot invade a person's right to privacy where it has been objectively
indicated that the motor home is being used as a residence.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Carney decision has clarified the automobile exception. By
delineating the basis for the exception-the ready mobility justification and the diminished expectation of privacy inherent in all motor
vehicles traveling the highway-the Court has expressed its interpretation of this often confused and misunderstood exception in a workable
manner. It is now clear that the exception applies to all motor vehicles
148. 766 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. It is arguable whether there really is a "bright line" rule, but it has at
the very least given police an objective standard on which to monitor their actions.
150. People v. Chavers, 33 Cal.3d 462, 469, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174, 658 P.2d
96, 101 (1983).
151. The Court lists several factors that would objectively indicate that the motor
home is being used as a residence, and thus take it outside the purview of the exception. Among these include its location, whether it is readily mobile, whether it is
licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access
to public roads. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 n.3.
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merely upon the existence of probable cause. This gives the police
a definitive standard by which to investigate crime, and gives those
traveling in a motor vehicle a clearer understanding of the level of
privacy they can expect to be afforded protection. It is the "bright
line" approach adopted by the Court that makes this decision both
effective and fair. Even if one disagrees with the result, the Court
has finally set a standard that can at least be understood.
G.

EDWARD MURPHY

